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The Effect of the War upon the Substance
of the International Gold StandardCHAPTER 7
The Redistribution of Economic and Financial Power
The effects of the war upon the London-centered system of
international banking and finance and upon British predomi-
nanc:e in international trade, which in combination consti-
tuted, according to our analysis, the substance of the pre-war
international gold standard, may be summed up in a single
sentence. The international gold standard before the war was
in reality a sterling exchange standard, but after the war this
was no longer true. It was no longer true because after the
war the gold standard had to function in a new economic en-
vironment in which the basic pull of Great Britain over the
exchanges of the world was weakened, and in which the
British 'international banking industry' was subject to new
and serious competition.
A New Economic Environment
Pre-War Trends in International Trade
The international trade of the nineteenth century, in particu-
lar that of Great Britain with the rest of the world, was in the
main complementary. Its outstanding characteristic was the
exchange of the manufactured goods of industrialized regions
for raw materials from elsewhere. At the beginning of the
twe:ntieth century this was giving way to international compe-
titi()n in the sale of industrial products of an intensity not
before experienced. In addition, certain very fundamental,
slow, and long run changes in the demand for both industrial
and agricultural products were taking place. The demand for
industrial products was beginning to shift relatively from the
output of heavy industry to that of more highly specialized
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and varied branches of production. A change of diet in west-
ern countries was already responsible for a relative decline
in the world consumption of cereals, and a heavy growth in
the consumption of fruit, dairy products, and of some 'colo-
nial' goods. At the same time the efficiency of production of
the basic cereals was being increased by the mechanization of
agriculture, while the elimination of the use of animals for
traction power was reducing the demand for major agricul-
tural products. Cotton and wool were beginning to give place
to silk and artificial silk in response to a demand for lighter
clothing.'
Such a general change in the basic characteristics of world
trade had a double significance for the London-centered gold
standard system. It affected the ability of outlying countries,
particularly those dependent upon single staple agricultural
products, to make the adjustments required by their member-
ship in the gold standard system.2 It also weakened the power
of Great Britain to perform the functions of a world financial
center, for it was a trend adverse to the particular type of
industrial development that had been the foundation of Brit-
ish economic power.
Great Britain's International Competitive Position at the
Outbreak of the War
During the last decade preceding the outbreak of the war it
was becoming evident that certain favorable trends in the
industrial life of England that had contributed to her ability
to dominate the world's exchanges were becoming weaker.
In addition to the gradual and slowly moving forces that
were beginning to change world demand in a way adverse to
British interest, Great Britain was beginning to stand in a
new competitive relation to other industrial powers. N ever-
theless, she continued to cling to the industrial organization
1 League of Nations, Course and Phases of the World Economic Depression,
prepared by Bertil Ohlin (rev. ed., Geneva, 1931), pp. 38—105 passim.
2Sir Arthur Salter. Recovery, the Second Effort (Century, 1932), pp. 37—42.CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 135
that had built up her economic power throughout the nine-
teenth century. In 1913 over half her total exports were ac-
counted for by iron and steel exports and textiles. Textiles
alone were one-third of her exports. She exported one-half of
all the textiles and about one-third of all the iron and steel
produced, and these two industries alone employed over
half o:E all the workers engaged in manufacturing in Great
Britain. The weakness of this position in view of the trends in
the domestic production and export trade of her competitors
is one of the most salient facts of the economic history of the
period just preceding the war.
By the end of the nineteenth century an internal struggle
between industrial and agricultural interests had resulted in
Germany's accepting the perils of international competition
in the sale of manufactured products and entering into that
struggle with all her national energy.8 While she did not abol-
her agricultural tariffs, she did not increase them from
igoo to 1914andshe rapidly expanded her manufactures. As
a result, between 1900 and 1913 German exports increased
more rapidly than British exports; in particular, her exports
cf iron and steel increased twice as rapidly as those of Great
Britain. In 1913 one-third of Germany's exports was ac-
counted for by iron and steel, machinery, chemicals, dyes,
and cotton manufactures, and these groups were increasing
more rapidly than her exports in general. By the beginning of
the twentieth century the internal development of the United
States :had been largely accomplished. The decline in the
proportion of her imports and the increase in the proportion
of her exports made up of manufactured goods, which had
begun in the 1850's, was rapidly growing. By 1900 only half
of America's imports and more than half of her exports were
manufactured and semi-manufactured goods. By the begin-
ning of the twentieth century Japan also had laid the founda-
8Oneconsequence of the growth of German industry and export trade was
that just before the war Germany began to remit direct, instead of trading in
sterling, and became increasingly independent of the London money market.136 BREAKDOWN
tions for a very rapid increase in the export of manufactured
goods, in particular of textiles. By the outbreak of the war she
was entrenched in the markets for textile goods in the Far
East. Finally, the foundations for industrial expansion had
been laid before the outbreak of the war in Canada and
Australia.4 Great Britain's share in world trade had already
begun to decline before the war,5 and the terms of trade,
which during the nineteenth century had been steadily fav-
orable, became unfavorable in the first decade of the twentieth
century.° The relation between the sheltered and unsheltered
trades began to be discussed and British industry took a more
critical attitude toward the traditional point of view of under-
writers with respect to the unrestricted use of the proceeds of
foreign loans.
The Weakening of England's Basic Pull over the Exchanges
The future historian will assign to these long run tendencies
their proper place among the ultimate causes of the first
World War. They were powerful forces, but their evolution-
ary character allowed time in which necessary adjustments
could be made. The outbreak of the war interrupted an his-
torical process in which each nation was working out gradu-
ally its economic relations with the rest of the world. By
isolating certain important markets and causing enormous
diversions in the distribution of productive powers it under-
mined the underlying balance in the world's exchanges. At
its conclusion the productive powers of the various countries
were no longer so adjusted as to produce an output that
would, on the average, be absorbed on a profitable basis by
the foreign and domestic markets combined. Europe had lost
4The material summarized in this Section and the next is taken from H. B.
Killough, International Trade (McGraw-Hill, 1938), pp. 246, 270—7,
Thewriter wishes to acknowledge Professor Killough's kindness in allowing
him to see this volume in manuscript.
5Great Britain's share in the trade of 25 leading countries was 21.3percent in
1890 and 19.9percent in igoG; Killough, cit., p. 395.
BF.W. Taussig, International Trade (Macmillan, 1929), pp. 253—4.CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 137
tothe rest of the world in the production not only of indus-
trial products and metals, but also of raw materials and food-
stuffs.. In particular the reduction in Europe's wheat supplies
owing to her own smaller production and the elimination of
Russia as a wheat exporter, had been balanced by increased
output in Canada, Argentina, and the United States. Of far
more immediate importance for England's basic pull on the
exchanges was the decline in British production of iron and
steel which coincided with a large increase in the production
of the United States and with the further entrenchment of
Japan as a strong competitor in the world's markets for tex-
tiles. The birth of new industries operating under high cost
in Europe because of the breakdown of international markets
during the war was a general factor which became increas-
ingly important in the post-war years. It has been frequently
said that the changes in the industrial productive equipment
and technique in the United States, Japan, Canada, and
Australia and in other countries during the war were such
as might otherwise have required a quarter of a century.
Of equal importance for the new British competitive posi-
tion was the change in the world's merchant marines. The
merchant fleet of the United Kingdom was a tenth less in
1920 than in 1910,whilethat of the United States was one-
half greater and that of Japan had more than doubled.
These developments all affected the future competitive
position of Great Britain in international trade. The extraor-
dinaLry efforts made during the war to finance the abnormal
increase in the import of goods into Europe and the draft
made upon British resources accumulated in the past in-
creased her competitive disadvantage. Her creditor position
was reduced between 1914and1920 approximately one-
quarter. Not only was she faced with new difficulties in main-
taming her middleman position in international trade, but
she had in some way to solve a threefold problem of capital
investment. British capacity for accumulating capital for over-
seas investment had to be adjusted both to the restricted op.138 BREAKDOWN
portunities for profitable employment abroad under the new
conditions and to the reduced current surplus of credit items
in the balance of payments, while the distribution of capital
investments at home had to be adjusted to the requirements
of an international trade in which stresses and strains long
gradually accumulating had been brought to premature frui-
tion in the forcing house of war. In solving these problems
Great Britain had to take account of certain new dangers.
It was certain, at the close of the war, that those who rendered
the services of middlemen in international transactions of all
kinds would find a deterioration in the assets against which
they could extend credit, whether long or short, because of
fundamental elements of risk introduced into the world's
markets for internationally traded-in goods. These risks were
greatly increased by the introduction of a new and powerful
factor of competition into the field of international credit ex-
tension by the rise of an international money market in New
York.
Quite aside from the abnormal distribution of gold and of
capital during the war, the ordinary peace-time international
banking functions that had been so largely concentrated in
London were becoming decentralized. At the close of hostili-
ties it was impossible to foresee the consequences of this de-
centralization. But it should have been evident even then
that in the field of international finance pre-war conditions
would probably never be restored. A whole set of new rela-
tions with the dollar was suddenly superimposed upon the
old set of relations with sterling. The old sterling relations
were broadly based upon a long historical development and
appropriate institutional techniques were established to regu-7
late them. The new relations with the dollar were emergency
relations created by a sudden upheaval. They were not solidi-
fied by an appropriate credit system. The war destroyed the
world-wide dominance of the pound but did not substitute
the dollar for it. It did not create even the prospect of a true
dollar exchange standard. It left a disintegrated situation.CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 139
Release of Forces leading to the Rise of an International
Money Market in New York
In one of its aspects the existence before the war of a world
credit system with a single center was a natural result of the
working out of principles of banking economy in the use of
primary money on a world-wide scale. The same principles
of banking economy were at work within the various coun-
tries and economic areas that were related to one another
through London. The United States was no exception. In
fact, because of its continental area and the diversity of its
natural resources, America was perhaps t.he most striking ex-
ample of the operation within a single political boundary of
forces similar to those which established London as the
world's financial center.
The Concentration of Funds in New York
Long before the war New York had become the center of a
gold system embracing an entire continent which
contained a vast variety of economic interests and was divided
into d.ebtor and creditor areas as the world was divided into
debto:r and creditor countries. It was the clearing center for
the transactions of the different sections of the country with
one another. The fundamental reason why New York oc-
cupied this position was its place in American trade, particu-
a market for the exchange of manufactured goods for
agricultural products. This is brought out by J. G. Smith in
The NewYorkMoney Market (II, 297—8):
"The difference between population and food production con-
stitutes the first fundamental basis for trade between the New
The of funds' is a loose one. J. G. Smith in The New
York Money Market, Vol. II, differentiates the three forms it takes and thereby
makes it possible to use the term with precision. He treats the concentration of
funds' in the New York money market under the triple distinction of con-
centration of deposits, of loans, and of transactions. In this section we use Pro-
Smith's very fruitful distinction. For the historical development of the
concentration of funds in New York before the war cf. Miss Myers' discussion
The New York Money Market, Vol. I.140 BREAKDOWN
York district and the rest of the country. New York buys agricul-
tural products and sells services and manufactured goods. Also
New York buys building materials largely from outside the Fed-
eral Reserve district. There are many manufactured products
which, owing to a geographical division of labor, New York does
not produce in great quantity—for instance, the textile industry
in New England and the South, the automobile industry of Cleve-
land and Detroit, the iron and steel industries of Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Illinois and Alabama, the pottery industries of southern
New Jersey and Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Ohio and Illinois,
all find their principal markets centered around New York. Some
of the heavy industries formerly located close to New York have
migrated to less expensive cities but still have their principal
markets in New York City. This centralized market for many
manufactured products exists not only because of the large con-
sumer market but because, as a derivative of that, buyers of con-
sumer markets all over the country make their inquiries to a very
large extent through dealers and brokers in New York City."
New York, moreover, was the distributing center for for-
eign imports into the United States and the entrepot center
for American trade in general, largely because of its geo-
graphical location. Consequently there was a demand for New
York funds from the interior to pay for imports. New York
became the channel through which the demand of the whole
country for foreign exchange was expressed, and because de-
mand for foreign exchange arose in this way it became easy
and natural to arrange for the financing of exports in New
York even though they were shipped from other ports.
Transactions, loans, and deposits were thus concentrated
in the New York market and consequently drafts on New
York became in effect a national currency in America. Re-
mittance from St. Louis to New Orleans could be made, for
example, in New York funds. Cross-entries on the books of
New York banks having the accounts of interior banks, and
payments between such banks made through the New York
clearing house, represented the use of New York funds to
settle transactions between interior points. New York fundsCHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 141
provided a customary method of remittance, and this became
an independent factor increasing the concentration of trans.
actions arising from New York's position in American trade.
Sharing with London before the War
'The long historical development that brought New York to
this position took place within the general framework of the
much older and much more inclusive process of the develop-
ment of a world-wide credit and banking system centered in
London.
New York shared with London the responsibility for pro-
viding the great gold standard area of which it was the finan-
cial center with the economic and financial services of a cen-
tral money market. The net balance of payments of the
various regions of the United States, the cotton producing
states for example, involved a settlement with other regions
of the United States as well as with other countries. In the
continuous maintenance of this balance, credit operations of
a time-bridging character played an essential role. Some of the
economic services of a central money market which the South
required for this purpose were provided by the New York
money market and some by the London money market. The
transactions were cleared on the books of New York banks
through the building up and cancellation of the deposits of
those banks, but this process involved corresponding debits
and credits on the books of London banks for that part of the
clearing process provided by them as principals. A part of the
clearing operation in New York was carried out by New York
banks merely as agents for London banks. Before the war the
interregional and international settlements required of the
various sections of the United States were accomplished
through the draft on New York, through the draft on Lon-
don, and through a distribution of gold and lawful money. In
this final means of settlement, which required both an inter-
nal and an international movement of gold, New York acted
as a channel of distribution.142 BREAKDOWN
It was, therefore, by a combination of the services of the
New York market and of the London market acting through
New York as a channel of distribution that the various sec-
tions of the United States were able to attract long term capi-
tal to supplement their own savings in the development of
their resources, to find diversified employment for their sav-
ings and for portions of their working capital, and to com-
mand adequate means of remittance to all parts of the United
States and of the world.
The Hierarchy of Financial Centers
This was true before the war of other financial centers such
as Paris, Berlin, Buenos Aires, Budapest, or Johannesburg. It
was the outstanding characteristic of the pre-war banking and
credit system that London supplemented the money market
centers of all other countries in greater or less degree. In other
words, all countries secured the essential money market serv-
ices in part from their own financial center and in part from
London. Inter-money market relationships of this type are
indeed a characteristic of any developed banking system.
What was true of the relationship of the various sections of
America to New York and London before the war was and is
true, for example, of the relationship of certain mid-western
states to Chicago and to New York. London, before the war,
stood at the apex of a world hierarchy of financial centers
through which the citizens of the most widely separated and
inconspicuous communities could exchange their products
and settle their debts. It was through London that a citizen
of Ged, Louisiana, could make final payment for a Kashmir
shawl.
In the perpetuation of such a system the momentum of an
early start, the creation of the proper institutional means, and
the inertia of habit played a great role. It is almost certainly
true that the American economy had the capacity for provid-
ing many of the financial services customarily rendered by
London long before 1914. But the mechanism of financingCHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 143
world trade and clearing through London was deeply in-
grained in the banking habits of the whole world. The ster-
ling bill was the instrument most readily received in payment
for American imports and the most universally offered in pay-
ment for American exports. It required a great shock to turn
any large portion of the world from these deeply rooted habits
of arranging for the financing of trade and for the payment
of international accounts. Such a shock was provided by the
of the world war.
Sharing with London during the War
The attempt to create an international money market in New
York meant the taking over by New York of the full respon-
for the operation of the domestic gold standard system
in America and the assumption by New York of the role of an
mternational money market. It must be considered as part of
a fundamental decentralization of the pre-war London cen-
tered system of finance, involving two clearly distinguishable
steps:
t)therestriction of the role of London in providing the services
of a financial center in the area in which it shared this function
with New York before the war
2)the participation of New York with London in furnishing
service:; of a financial center in areas in which New York did not
participate before the war.
In the domain of long term credit extension both these
steps were taken by the sudden rise of America to the position
of financier of the war. During the period of her neutrality
the compelling force was the opportunity for the employment
of cap:ital and labor suddenly opened up by the special de-
mands of the belligerents. The position was well described by
Secretary Lansing in the letter to President Wilson of Sep-
tember 6, 1915alreadyquoted:
the European countries cannot find means to pay for the ex-
cess of goods sold to them over those purchased from them, they
will have to stop buying and our present export trade will shrink144 BREAKDOWN
proportionately. The result would be restriction of outputs, in-
dustrial depression, idle capital and idle labor, numerous failures,
financial demoralization and general unrest and suffering among
the laboring classes.
Probably a billion and three-quarters of the excess of European
purchases can be taken care of by the sale of American securities
held in Europe and by the transfer of trade balances of Oriental
countries, but that will leave three-quarters of a billion to be met
in some other way. Furthermore, even if that is arranged, we will
have to face a more serious situation in January, 1916, as the
American securities held abroad will have been exhausted.
I believe that Secretary McAdoo is convinced and I agree with
him that there is only one means of avoiding this situation which
would so seriously affect economic conditions in this country and
that is the flotation of large bond issues by the belligerent govern.
ments.
•Our financial institutions have the money to loan and wish to
do so. On account of the great balance of trade in our favor, the
proceeds of these loans would be expended here. The result would
be a maintenance of the credit of the borrowing nations based on
their gold reserve, a continuance of our commerce at its present
volume and industrial activity with the consequent employment
of capital and labor and national prosperity."
After the United States entered the war this motive con-
tinued, in addition to the all absorbing objective of military
victory. In the post-war period the export capacity thus cre-
ated provided the economic motive for continued foreign
lending.
In the field of short term credit the outbreak of the war
offered a long sought opportunity to America to take the first
step toward financing American trade in dollars and creating
an American foreign banking system.
New York and London as Grantors of Acceptance Credit
The mechanism of the London acceptance market was re-
stored to effective operation during the war by the measures
referred to above. In effect these measures resulted in carryingCHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 145
overcold storage until the end of the war £50 million of
morai:orium acceptances. Relieved of this burden, the accept-
ance houses resumed their normal functions, and the whole
machinery by which the sterling bill had financed half the
world's foreign trade and provided an international medium
of exchange was restored to working order. The volume of
sterling bills, however, did not return to the pre-crisis level.
The shock to the whole system of world trade, of which the
sterling bill was a finely adjusted part, was too great. New
permanent forces of decline were set in motion which did not
become apparent as basic factors in the life of the London
money market until some years after the war.8 Nevertheless
two changes of paramount importance can be clearly attrib-
uted to the war period—new methods of financing trade and
the rise of the dollar bill.
CHANGES IN METHODS OF FINANCING TRADE
Even before the war students of the money markets had ob-
served that the use of the foreign bill was declining and that
cash transactions were being substituted for it.9 The growing
use of the telegraphic transfer in the settlement of interna-
tional indebtedness was already a force tending to reduce the
volume of sterling acceptances before the war. It was greatly
encouraged during the war because of the uncertainty created
in the minds of merchants by war-time conditions which led
them to demand cash payments instead of resorting to accept-
ance credit. It was encouraged by the growth of the amalgam-
ation movement among British banks which made it easier
and more natural in many cases to resort to the method of
bank advance and settlement by telegraphic transfer instead
of bills. Furthermore, during the war the government cx-
SCf.Ch. ii,NewYork and London as Grantors of Acceptance Credit, and
Ch. ig, Changes in Money Market Technique.
°Testimonyof A. Bogie, General Manager of the Commercial Bank of Scot-
land in interviews on the Banking and Currency Systems of England, Scotland,
France, Germany, Switzerland, and italy(National Monetary Commission,
1912),I,i8o—i. Quoted in Harris, cit., pp. 294if.146 BREAKDOWN
tended its control over the import of many commodities pre-
viously financed by acceptance credit. In financing its imports,
the government did not use the sterling acceptance, and trade
in articles not financed by the government was greatly re-
duced.
Though these influences were, to a large extent, of purely
war-time origin, the increased use of the telegraphic transfer
and the changes in the methods of financing wool, wheat, cot-
ton, and meat became permanent features of the London mar-
ket in the post-war period. The decline of the American cot-
ton bill, for example—so characteristic of the London dis-
count market for many years—seems to have been due to a
permanent change in the method of financing cotton exports.
Instead of many small bills being drawn upon British names
by cotton growers, large revolving credits established in favor
of the growers by American banks and replenished by tele-
graphic transfers became after the war a feature of the financ-
ing of the American cotton crop. A similar change in methods
of financing Japanese exports is cited by Professor Harris,
who has pointed out the growth of advances by the Bank of
Japan against foreign bills during the war. The purchase of
such bills by the Bank of Japan and their settlement by tele-
graphic transfer when due undoubtedly deprived the London
market of part of its supply of bills.'0
THE RISE OF THE DOLLAR BILL
During the war the London market was deprived of a large
volume of bills previously flowing to it from drawers in en-
emy countries. This was, for the duration of the war at least,
an important breach in the principle of world clearance
through London. Of far more permanent significance, how-
ever, was the growth of a market for dollar acceptances in
New York. This was an expression of the pre-war trend in the
character and direction of American foreign trade. The
groundwork for the creation of an American discount market
Harris,op. cit., pp. cf. Inouye, op. cit., pp. 9—15.CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 147
'waslaid in the Federal Reserve Act, which gave to national
•banks the power to accept bills drawn upon them and pro-
'vided that acceptances so made should be eligible for discount
and purchase at the Federal Reserve banks. For at least a dec-
ade before the passage of the Federal Reserve Act ways and
means of promoting American export trade in manufactured
goods had been actively discussed in the United States.
Among these were the extension of the foreign facilities of
American banks and the creation of an acceptance market in
New York. There had been an increasing desire to provide
American exporters with facilities in foreign countries corn-
parable to those built up during the nineteenth century by
British banks and during the latter part of the nineteenth
and the first part of the twentieth century by German, Italian,
and other foreign banks. The extraordinary variety and
strength of the sources of bills drawn on English acceptance
houses and banks, and pouring into London through the sys-
tem of foreign branch banks, controlled or affiliated banks, or
long established foreign connections, is shown by tables pre-
pared for these studies by P. L. J. Bareau in London. Though
the facilities of this system provided American commerce with
cheap and efficient financing, the increasingly competitive na-
ture of American exports of manufactures rendered depend-
ence on these foreign facilities distasteful to those engaged in
an aggressive expansion of American trade. There was a
strong feeling that the use of the sterling acceptance was a
handicap to American trade because it strengthened the pref-
erence for British goods already built up by long standing
connections and by British controlled enterprises throughout
the wo:rld. The evidence of this feeling is embodied in a sub-
stantial, volume of current and ephemeral literature in which
these disadvantages are pointed out and in the interest taken
in the details of the operation of the London acceptance mar-
ket by the investigators of the National Monetary Commis-
sion of 1910.Fromthe day on which the war broke out Amer-
icans began to lay the foundations for an extension of Amen-148 BREAKDOWN
can banking abroad and therefore for the provision, at the
points of origin of foreign business, of a supply of bills drawn
under American credits. The war did not lay the foundations
for this movement, but it swept away the obstacles that had
impeded its development.
In consonance with the principle of detailed banking regu-
lation appropriate to the unit banking system of the United
States, the legal provisions for the creation of a discount mar-
ket in New York were cast in the mold of a system of written
regulations. The basic conception with which the American
acceptance market was endowed by its founders was that of
the self-liquidating salt water bill. In establishing this prin-
ciple it was thought that the best British practice was being
followed. The British banker's acceptance, however, was a
more flexible instrument than the American regulatory sys-
tem conceived it to be. In the London acceptance market
there was a basic volume of self-liquidating commercial bills
but also a smaller, though still substantial, volume of bills
drawn for interest arbitrage and other financial purposes.
Nothing is more difficult, as has been demonstrated time and
again by the testimony of representatives of the City in the
British courts, than to determine 'market practice' in London
before the war. It is, therefore, not surprising that under the
pressure of war-time conditions the rigid principle of confin-
ing the dollar acceptance within the boundaries of what was
thought to be British practice was gradually broken down by
a series of liberalizing regulations and interpretations.
The expansion of American banking abroad during the
actual years of hostilities was very moderate. Even at its height
in 1920, it was but a small affair in comparison with British
foreign banking.11 The creation of a steady demand for the
banker's acceptance also encountered peculiar difficulties ow-
ing to the practice of daily settlements on the New York Stock
11 C. W. Phelps, The Foreign Expansion of American Banks (Ronald Press,
1927),pp.4 and 20.CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 149
:Exchangeand the customary use of call loans as secondary
reserves by American banks.
In spite of these difficulties, the underlying trends of Amer.
commerce would, undoubtedly, have found expression in
a discount market in New York even if there had been no
war, but the war provided the occasion for the extraordinarily
rapid growth of this market. By 1917onebillion dollars of
banker's acceptances were outstanding in New York, of which
two-thirds were drawn to finance foreign trade
This was an important modification in the clearing functions
of the London market. Part of the international concentra-
tion of liabilities in London had been shifted to New York.
New York and London as Holders of Foreign Balances
Closely related to the decline in the sterling bill were changes
in the volume and nature of foreign balances deposited in the
London money market during the war. Some of these were
of a purely war-time character, yet they were not unconnected
with changes in the methods of financing trade which had be-
gun before the war.
WAR-TIME BALANCES IN LONDON
Although, in the early weeks of the war, foreign banks, and
especially Dominion and Colonial banks, had great difficulty
in maintaining their bank balances in London, this situation
was quickly altered by an unparalleled growth of the deposits
at the disposal of such institutions. Out of these increasing
balances advances made in the crisis at the outbreak of the
war were repaid in It has already been pointed out in
connection with the operations of foreign exchange pegging
that large balances were left in London, as in other countries,
12 On all questions relating to the growth of the New York discount market
the admirable treatment of Professor Beckhart in The New York Money Mar-
ket, III, 251—462,shouldbe consulted.
Harris, op. cit.,pp.103—4, 128.150 BREAKDOWN
by exporters who did not wish to remit home on account of
adverse exchanges. Such exporters had to continue to accumu-
late sterling balances if they were to continue to export. This
process was greatly encouraged and extended by the willing-
ness of the various governments to come to the support of the
exchanges, for this contributed to the willingness of holders
of foreign balances to wait for better rates. There was, there-
fore, a cumulative effect through which official support of the
exchanges attracted unofficial support. Not only did balances
accumulate in London for the Dominions and neutrals whose
nationals did not wish to remit at market rates of sterling ex-
change, but also as war-time note inflation in various coun-
tries developed, there was a quiet, steady flight of capital to
England in the form of the retention of bank balances built
up through trade and of the holdings of securities in London
by foreigners. An example has been given above in connec-
tion with the efforts of the German government to stimulate
the export of foreign securities owned by Germans to support
the mark exchange.
Professor Harris has summarized various data published in
foreign countries bearing upon the increase of foreign bal-
ances in London (Monetary Problems of the British Empire,
pp. 49—50):
"An indication of the large holdings of foreign assets in London
is given in the banking reports of foreign countries. The Guar-
anty Trusty Company of New York had 25 million dollars on
deposit in London in 1918. According to a semi-official report,
Swiss Banks deposited 100 million francs with the Bank of Eng-
land in 1918. A large part of Scandinavian balances was held in
London. The excess of foreign assets over foreign liabilities of all
Norwegian banks was as follows:
JULY ENDOFYEAR
1914 1916 1918 1919
(millionsof kroner)
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Anotherofficial report reveals that in 1919Norwegianbanks had
assets of £34 million, a very large part of which was bank balances
andothershort-term assets. The excess of foreign assets over for-
eign liabilities of Swedish banks was as follows:
1914 1916 1917 1918 1919
(millionsof kronor)
98 349 486 484 554
Colonial and Dominion banks apparently adhered to their tradi-
tional type of investment in London, namely, stock exchange
loans, Treasury Bills, and deposits with bill brokers. However,
the South African Government accumulated large balances in
London which were deposited with the Imperial Treasury. The
deposits abroad of Canadian banks were unusually large in the
middle of 1917and1918. It seems probable that large deposits
were held in London. The Banco de La Nacion advanced 3.6
and 6.24 million pesos on the security of balances abroad. A large
part of these was held in London."
In conjunction with the decline in the volume of bankers'
bills, t.hese balances became available for absorbing the war-
time issues of the British government, especially short term
treasury bills, and for use by the government through the sys-
i:em oE 'special deposits.'
WAR-TIME BALANCES IN NEW YORK
The New York money market soon began to take its place
with London as a holder of foreign deposits. During the last
six months of 1914 calculations of the balance of payments of
the United States disclosed large unaccounted for credits.
'These are explained by Ralph A. Young as being due to large
withdrawals of American deposits abroad and heavy accumu-
of American bank deposits by belligerent govern-
:ments. These were gradually built up to finance the expand-
.ing needs of the belligerents for American products and were
also increased by various forms of capital flight from Europe.'4
'4R. A. Young, The International Financial Position of the United States
(National Industrial Conference Board, 1929), pp.40—1.152 BREAKDOWN
The American balance of payments estimates fori915 dis-
closed the same trend. With the new situation that accom-
panied the pegging of the sterling-dollar exchange and the
increasing drafts upon neutral countries for war supplies, the
distribution of foreign deposits spread more widely. In igi6
American bank balances due foreigners were reduced but
American balances were accumulated in neutral countries.
TABLE 9
Dollar Balances owed by the United States to Foreign Areas
and owed by Foreign Areas to the United States, 1918-1919
Feb. 27,1918 June26,1918 Dec.31,1918 June25,1919
Owed DueOwed DueOwed DueOwedDue
byto by to by to by to
U.S.U.S.U.S.U.S.U.S.U.S.U.S.U.S.
(millions of dollars)
Europe—Allies 507136 62194 50885 36970
Europe—Neutrals 264 i 281 324 I 277 6
Europe—Central
Powers 3 6 g 2 12 2 19
Asia 6728 13739 17586 '55'58
NorthAmerica 17 '3489 10777 162
SouthAmerica 40 37 tOO59 g662 8z
6 6 13
Total gg7223 1,276295 1,214332 1,049406
NetBalance 774 g8x 882 643
SOURCE: Foreign Exchange Operations, 1918-1919 (Federal Reserve Bulletin,
Dec.1921,pp. 1408-10)
This was accompanied by the rapid growth of the extension
of short term credit to the belligerents through the American
discount market and other forms of American short term ad-
vance.
The forces tending to build up balances held in America
by foreigners continued to be strong during 1917andi 918.
This was true of the deposits of the Allies to whom America
was extending credit and also of the deposits of neutrals,
which could not be easily withdrawn after the imposition of
the gold embargo by the United States. In December 1918,
according to the figures presented by the Federal Reserve
Board in 1921,nearlya billion and a quarter dollars of for-CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 153
eign balances were held by banks in the United States as
against $332 million of foreign deposits due them (Table 9).
The position, therefore, with respect to the holdings of for-
eign balances and acceptances in the central money markets
was strikingly different at the close of the war from the posi-
tion before the war. Not only were the sources from which ac-
ceptance credit could be obtained to finance trade decentral-
ized but there was a new international distribution of bank
deposits. The connection between the volume of such de-
posits and the essential transactions of international finance
was also weakened in large degree, and the size of the balances
that were free to move from one market to another had be-
come a threat to the stability of the exchanges. Part of the
international concentration of deposits in London had shifted
to New York.
London and New York as International Distributors of Se-
curities
After April 1915,whenthe system of minimum prices
adopted during the crisis was abolished, the New York Stock
Exch.ange was the only stock exchange in the world that did
not restrict trading in foreign securities. It became the chief
market for the securities of both belligerent and neutral coun-
tries. Belligerents had to borrow in the United States to fi-
nance their requirements, and many neutral borrowers, find-
ing their usual markets cut off, were obliged to apply for long
term credit in the New York market. Even certain British bor-
rowers, unable to get long term credit in London because of
the restrictions upon the capital market there, had to apply
to the New York market. The City of Dublin and Metropoli-
tan Water Board issues in 1916areexamples. The only re-
spect in which the activity of the New York Stock Exchange
was restricted by war-time conditions was in the use of arbi-
trage transactions in American securities to hold the ex-
changes together, but the foundation was laid for a much
wider security arbitrage business after the war.154 BREAKDOWN
The gradual broadening of the foreign business of the New
York Stock Exchange was only a part of the change during
the war in the share of the London Stock Exchange in the
business of distributing international securities. Before the
war London shared the burden of distributing American se-
curities with the New York Stock Exchange, and it is prob-
ably true that as late as 1906 the London Stock Exchange was
a more important market for American securities than the
New York Stock Exchange. In this respect the situation was
fundamentally altered. during the war. Part of the interna-
tional concentration of transactions in London had shifted to
New York.
Changes brought about by the War in the Practices
of the London Money Market
The underlying merchandise movement during the war
forced all other considerations to yield to it. It weakened the
basic pull of Great Britain over the foreign exchanges and
suddenly made the United States a great competitor of Lon-
don in the field of international finance. It had as a further
consequence the following definite changes in the nature of
the business of the London money market:
i)therise of the treasury bill
2)the decline of the power of London and
the substitution of a deposit-attracting policy
3)the victory of the principle that the proceeds of loans placed
in Great Britain should be spent in Great Britain.
Together these changes altered the technical means by
which stable domestic credit conditions were maintained in
England, and by which sterling credit was used as a time-
bridging and adjusting factor to maintain stabLe international
credit conditions. They modified the manner in which Eng-
land was able to exercise a 'surface pull' over the exchanges.
Though prompted by war-time necessities they left legacies
15Forthis phrase I am indebted to my colleague Carel Jan Smit.CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 155
the post-war period that could be partly discerned even
during the war itself.
Rise 0! the Treasury Bill
During the war it was virtually impossible for any central
bank other than the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve
banks to pursue a discount policy of credit control. Even in
America after April 1917,marketrates of interest were com-
PletelY dominated by the Treasury. In the London market
rates were dominated by the treasury bill rate and the rate on
'special deposits' at the Bank of England. The gap between
the open market rate for bills and Bank rate had relatively
little significance, and therefore the decline in the volume of
sterling commercial bills did not add to the existing problems
of credit control. On the other hand, this decline offered cer-
tain very definite advantages to the government. It created a
shortage in the supply of short term investments that was ad-
mirably filled by treasury bills. This was of advantage to the
government in placing its short term debt. Moreover, the is-
sue of treasury bills which, by the end of 1916, were offered
to the public in unlimited amounts at fixed rates, became part
of a technique by which the government regularly replen-
ishedbalances at the Bank of England without undue dis-
turbance to the money market. Therefore, under stress of its
war-time needs the government definitely discouraged the use
of trade bills through regulations issued under the Defense
of the Realm Act. In this way it reserved the resources of the
short term market for its own financing,16 and treasury bills
outstanding grew from £81 million on March 31, 1915to
£973 million on March 31,1918.
Though the British government earnestly desired to see
the sterling acceptance reestablished after the emergency its
treasury bill policy, like other war-time financial policies, left
a legacy for post-war days. It was partly responsible for more
DORA41d, 4idd, Harris, op. cit., p.295.156 BREAKDOWN
frequent use of the type of control so spectacularly employed
in 1 go6 in connection with American finance bills. Moreover,
the government's requirements for short term credit were
a factor in the efforts of the Bank of England after the war to
exercise a stricter general supervision over the drawing of
finance bills than had been customary before the war.
The rise of the treasury bill satisfactorily solved the prob-
1cm of providing secondary reserves for the joint stock banks
created by the decline in bankers acceptances. For the accept-
ance houses the necessity of sharing a reduced volume of ac-
ceptance business with the joint stock banks meant a loss of
business and revenue. For the discount houses the decline in
the sterling bankers acceptance meant a gradual undermin-
ing of their distinctive functions in the money market. For
the discount market as a whole the new situation raised ques-
tions of the most fundamental character going to the heart of
its whole significance in the British financial system. The
characteristic rate structure in the London market and the
way in which Bank rate was rendered effective depended for
their efficient operation upon the fact that the major short
term instrument dealt in by that market was the bankers ac-
ceptance. To treat the treasury bill as the discount house tra-
ditionally treated the bankers acceptance was to act as if the
two instruments were the same. But they are not the same in
their relation to either the technique of domestic credit con-
trol or the control of the foreign exchanges.'7
The Substitution of a Deposit-Attracting Policy for a Deposit-
Corn pelling Power
The accumulation of abnormal amounts of foreign balances
in the London market was also a direct consequence of con-
ditions that were not expected to continue after the conclu-
sion of peace. Nevertheless, the importance of retaining such
balances to support the exchanges remained great as long as
1TCf. Ch. g,TheBritish Attempt to Return to Normal Techniques of Credit
Control, and Ch. ig,TheDiscount Market.CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 157
the underlying forces drawing balances to London were im-
paired by the weakening of Great Britain's foreign trade posi-
tion and the new competition of New York as a foreign lender
and an international financial middleman. By the end of the
war there was no doubt that the mass of foreign deposits at-
tracted by the deposit-compelling power of London as an
international financial center had been to some degree re-
placed by a volume of deposits that could be retained in Lon-
don only by the offer of advantageous terms. London had now
to retain foreign balances by a deposit-attracting policy. It
could no longer command them on its own terms.
The Victory of the Principle that the Proceeds of Foreign
Loans should be spent at Home
One of the forces leading to the provision of the legal basis
for building up a discount market in New York was the con-
victicn that the British branch banking system and the de-
pendence of potential American markets upon British capital
exports gave an overwhelming competitive advantage to Brit-
ish trade. The kernel of truth that underlay this attitude helps
to explain the tenacity with which British underwriters clung
to the principle that borrowers of British funds should be free
to use them as they saw fit. The British had long been in a
position. without too great sacrifice of particular interests, to
give practical recognition to the principle that restrictions
upon. the proceeds of international loans prevent such loans
from bringing about equilibrium in the world's balances of
payments and promoting the increase of international trade
in general upon which the welfare of the lending countries
depends. We have used government war loans as a laboratory
example of this principle, which is of cardinal importance
when lenders are few, trade is free, and exchanges are in-
tended to be stable.
Until the outbreak of the war, the merchant bankers of
London steadily refused to recognize any obligation to pro-
mote the interest of any particular industry. No restrictions158 BREAKDOWN
were placed upon the borrower. For example, if a govern-
ment in northern Europe came to London to borrow money
to build a bridge, the merchant banker did not inquire too
closely where the materials for it were to be purchased. He
did not stipulate that they should be purchased from a Brit-
ish maker, but he did know that the chances were much more
than even that they would be bought at least in part in Great
Britain, or that if purchased in Belgium or Germany, sterling
would fall into the hands of someone who had to meet obli-
gations in Great Britain growing out of British trade, finance,
or insurance activity. The prevailing attitude was that new
capital issues stimulated trade in general, and, therefore, Brit-
ish trade as a whole. To have followed the French example of
imposing restrictions upon the use of the proceeds of foreign
loans and the character of foreign loans placed in the market
would have been to impair the efficiency of the great world-
wide international banking structure centered in London.
Indeed, one of the distinguishing characteristics of the whole
pre-war gold standard system was precisely the lack of restric-
tion imposed by the London market upon the utilization of
sterling as a world medium of exchange. Those in control of
the City in London never contemplated taking steps restrict-
ing the use of the proceeds of loans except when these were
made for the express purpose of purchasing gold. The under-
lying position of Great Britain was still tremendously strong.
It was probably stronger than British statistics alone would
indicate, because from an economic point of view, the British
balance of payments should probably be extended to include
the balance of payments of the Crown Colonies, and perhaps
of some of the Dominions also.
For the interpretation of the functioning of the gold stand-
ard after the war it is of great significance that the broad cos-
mopolitan conception of their functions by British interna-
tional lenders did not survive the war. The weakening of
Great Britain's position as a competitor in international
trade, to which we have referred, though it did not overthrow,CHANGES IN SUBSTANCE 159
was tending gradually to undermine this point of view even
before the war. After 1870 two broad changes took place in
British capital exports: first, a change in its geographical dis-
tribution from the continent of Europe to the more rapidly
developing countries of the Empire and South and North
America; second, a transition from the accumulation of a
new surplus of savings available for foreign invest-
ment to the simple reinvestment of income from previous
foreign investments.'8 These were the forerunners of another
change more subtle and difficult to measure. In the decade
before the war Great Britain was beginning to lend abroad
because she had to. Past British capital exports had helped to
develop other countries industrially and British products
were feeling more and more intense competition. To protect
their home markets other countries were erecting tariff bar-
riers, which in their incidence bore heavily on England. The
broad profit opportunities of British export industry were
being restricted. It therefore became more and more a source
of irritation to British industrial interests that the attitude of
the banker toward the proceeds of foreign loans remained un-
changed. The large proportion of new capital investment,
which from 1870 to 1914wentto the Empire, undoubtedly
diminished the volume of this criticism. Empire loans, and
in particular those of the Crown Colonies and of India, were
almost sure to result in purchases in Great Britain. The
Crown Agents for the Colonies, for example, not only placed
new •borrowing in London, but also acted as purchasing
agents for the Colonies in London. A similar close connection
between loans and purchases was true of India. Nevertheless,
particular loans, the proceeds of which went apparently to aid
other industrial countries to encroach upon markets formerly
British, were subjected to more and more criticism. The di-
rect connection between specific orders to British industries
and foreign loans became gradually a subject of concern,
18 Herbert Feis, Europe, the World's Banker, 1870—1914 (YaleUniversityPress,
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which was shared even by the bankers, though their general
point of view was unaltered. It is probable, though difficult
to verify, that the great expansion of capital exports during
the last pre-war decade was definitely encouraged by the joint
stock banks, owing to their increasing eagerness to support
British export trade.
A fissure had been opened in the solid foundation of the
London-centered international gold standard system. The ac-
centuation of the basic pre-war trends in international trade
after 1914, together with the experience of war-time lending,
widened this fissure into a chasm. The war ended with a vic-
tory in Great Britain of the principle that the proceeds of for-
eign loans should be spent in the lender's country.
New Types of Management in London
These changes in the functioning of London as the interna-
tional financial and clearing center for the world introduced
certain new elements of management into the London money
market, whose chief characteristics were a new concern with
total foreign balances deposited in London and with total for-
eign issues placed in the London market, and an increased
power in money market control on the part of the Bank of
England.
During the war the Banking and Currency Committee, of
which the active members were Sir Felix Schuster and Lord
Cunliffe, collected data on foreign balances in London and
compared them with information of the same sort gathered
for the three pre-war years. Though this information was not
published, it was made part of the data upon which the ad-
ministrators of British war finance relied in the formulation
of policy. This was a type of financial management entirely
foreign to pre-war British practice.
The necessities of war finance required restrictions upon
capital exports and the closing of the capital market to bor-
rowers whose requirements coqid not be shown to contribute
directly to war purposes. Both these elements of TreasuryCHANGES IN SUBSTANCE i6i
control of the market were novel, for government interven-
tion in the business of foreign underwriters in the London
market before the war had been restricted to cases in which
large political questions of foreign policy were involved.
Great as the influence of the Bank of England had always
been in the London money market, it did not carry with it
the &ernent of compulsion that came during the war by virtue
of the fact that the Bank then expressed to the market or re-
flected 'Treasury views.' This added authority continued after
the war and was generally recognized. It was a change similar
to many other changes in British practice, nonetheless real for
having been quietly accomplished.